It is the persistence of social suffering in a world in which it could be eliminated that for Adorno is the source of the need for critical reflection, for philosophy. Philosophy continues and gains its cultural place because an as yet unbridgeable abyss separates the social potential for the relief of unnecessary human suffering and its emphatic continuance. Philosophy now is the culturally bound repository for the systematic acknowledgement and articulation of the meaning of the expanse of human suffering within (...) technologically advanced societies that are already committed to liberal ideals of freedom and equality. (shrink)

Following the lead of Annette Baier, this essay argues that trust relations provide the ethical substance of everyday living. When A trusts B, A unreflectively allows B to approach sufficiently close so as to be able to harm A. In order for this to be possible, A practically presupposes that B perceives A as a person and will hence act accordingly. Trust relations are relations of mutual recognition in which we acknowledge our mutual standing and vulnerability with respect to one (...) another. A robust account of trust assumes: first, trust relations are primary and practical, and while monitored by reason, they are not rationally constituted; second, trust can sustain its practical primacy over moral reason because it is developmentally prior to reason; and third, trust relations can be the bearers of our worth and vulnerability because they are the developmental products of first love. (shrink)

The Geological Society of London was the first learned society to be devoted solely to geology, and its members were responsible for much of the spectacular progress of the science in the nineteenth century. Its distinctive character as a centre of geological discussion and research was established within the first five years from its foundation in 1807. During this period its activities were directed, and its policies largely shaped, by its President, George Bellas Greenough, on whose unpublished papers this account (...) is chiefly based.The Society began as a small scientific dining club in London, but it developed rapidly into a learned society with a nation-wide membership. It became so independent in outlook and so active in research that it was felt to threaten the esteem of the Royal Society; and little more than a year after its foundation it clashed with the Royal Society so violently that its continued existence was for a time uncertain.Its development into a large independent society was the outcome of its ‘Baconian’ view of the importance of collecting geological facts as a surer basis for geological theories. For this purpose it initiated an ambitious scheme for co-operative research, which would unite the efforts of ‘philosophers’ with those of ‘practical men’. Only personal reasons seem to have kept the most prominent of the practical men—William Smith—from co-operating with the Society. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry. By James Turner Johnson.

Motivated by an old construction due to J. Kalman that relates distributive lattices and centered Kleene algebras we define the functor K • relating integral residuated lattices with 0 with certain involutive residuated lattices. Our work is also based on the results obtained by Cignoli about an adjunction between Heyting and Nelson algebras, which is an enrichment of the basic adjunction between lattices and Kleene algebras. The lifting of the functor to the category of residuated lattices leads us to study (...) other adjunctions and equivalences. For example, we treat the functor C whose domain is cuRL, the category of involutive residuated lattices M whose unit is fixed by the involution and has a Boolean complement c. If we restrict to the full subcategory NRL of cuRL of those objects that have a nilpotent c, then C is an equivalence. In fact, C M is isomorphic to C e M, and C e is adjoint to, where assigns to an object A of IRL0 the product A × A 0 which is an object of NRL. (shrink)

Thirty-three physicians, bioethicists, and medical economists from ten different countries met at Lawrence University, Appleton, Wisconsin, to create The Appleton Consensus: International Guidelines for Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment. The guidelines deal with four specific decision-making circumstances: 1. Five guidelines were created for decisions involving competent patients or patients who have executed an advance directive before becoming incompetent, and those guidelines fell into three categories. 2. Thirteen guidelines were created for decisions involving patients who were once competent, but are not (...) now competent, who have not executed an advance directive. 3. Seven guidelines were created for decisions involving patients who are not now and never have been competent, for whom 'no substituted judgement' can be rendered. 4. Eleven guidelines were created for decisions involving the scarcity of medical resources, which exists in all communities. Five concepts were identified as being critical in the establishment of priorities, given the reality of scarce health resources (1). The term 'physician' is used in the American sense, synonymous with 'medical practitioner'. (shrink)

In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the United States Supreme Court announced a paradigm shift in jurisprudence. Drawing specifically on mounting scientific evidence that adolescents are qualitatively different from adults in their decision-making capacities, the Supreme Court recognized that adolescents are not adults in all but age. The Court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than adult persons. The Supreme Court further solidified (...) its position regarding adolescents as less than fully mature and responsible decisionmakers in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012). In each case, the Court concluded that the scientific evidence does not support the conclusion that children under 18 years of age possess adult capacities for personal agency, rationality, and mature choice. This study explores the implications of the Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama for the “mature minor” standard for medical decision making. It argues that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller require no less than a radical reassessment of how healthcare institutions, courts of law, and public policy are obliged to regard minors as medical decisionmakers. The “mature minor” standard for medical decision making must be abandoned. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I examine the arguments against physician assisted suicide . Many of these arguments are consequentialist. Consequentialist arguments rely on empirical claims about the future and thus their strength depends on how likely it is that the predictions will be realized. I discuss these predictions against the backdrop of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and the practice of PAS in the Netherlands. I then turn to a specific consequentialist argument against PAS – Susan M. Wolf's feminist critique of (...) the practice. Finally, I examine the two most prominent deontological arguments against PAS. Ultimately, I conclude that no anti‐PAS argument has merit. Although I do not provide positive arguments for PAS, if none of the arguments against it are strong, we have no reason not to legalize it. (shrink)

This study examines the specificvalues held by consumers towards organic andconventionally produced meat, with particularreference to moral issues surrounding foodanimal production. A quota sample of 30 femalesfrom both a rural and an urban area of Scotland, were interviewed. Overall, there was lowcommitment towards the purchase of organicmeats and little concern for ethical issues.Price and product appearance were the primarymeat selection criteria, the latter being usedas a predictor of eating quality. Manyattitude-behavior anomalies were identified,mainly as a result of respondents' cognitivedissonance and (...) lack of understanding regardingmeat production criteria underpinning meatquality marks, e.g., Soil Association label.Responsibilities for ethical issues appeared tobe delegated by the consumer to the meatretailer or government. This raises issuesabout educating consumers and bringingconsumers closer to understanding meatproduction systems. A conceptual framework isproposed that illustrates the significance ofconsumer involvement in how meat-purchasingdecisions are approached in terms of theevaluation of tangible and or intangiblequality attributes. The results also point tothe need for further research into thoseaspects of quality that individuals tend toaddress at the level of the citizen,rather than at the point of purchase. (shrink)

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective—and morally justified—means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions (...) that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where “market-place morality” is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves. (shrink)

This essay originated as a reply to Richard Rorty's ”Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy“. In it, I contest Rorty's deployment of the categories of private selfcreation and the collective political enterprise of increasing freedom, first developed in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, to demonstrate that the philosophical projects of Habermas and Derrida are complementary rather than antagonistic. The focus of my critique is two-fold: firstly, I contend that so-called critiques of metaphysics are always simutaneously engaging with some form of (...) social domination or disintegration (e.g. nihilism or societal rationalization); secondly, I argue that the fault-line in Rorty's thought that structures his categories is his, Davidson inspired, naturalized philosophy of language. This philosophy of language falls afoul of Heidegger's analysis of the present-to-hand. (shrink)

Residency training in the Netherlands is to be restructured over the coming years. To this end a general competence profile for medical specialists has been introduced. This profile is nearly the same as the Canadian CanMEDS 2000 model, which describes seven general areas of medical specialist competence, one of which is professionalism. In order to establish a training programme for residents and their instructors based on this competence, it is necessary to develop a vision that does justice to everyday medical (...) practice. The two most prevailing views of professionalism—as personal, or as a behavioural characteristic—fall short of this. Only when professionalism is understood as reflective professionalism does it encompass the fundamental contextuality of medical treatment. This means that the focus of training and assessment must be shifted to accountability for treatment. (shrink)

Next SectionBackground: Publication bias and discrimination are increasingly recognised in medicine. A survey was conducted to determine if medical journals were more likely to publish research reports from members of their own than a rival journal’s editorial board. Methods: A retrospective review was conducted of all research reports published in 2006 in the four competing medical journals within five medical specialties. Only three journals were willing to divulge the authorship of reports that had been rejected. Results: Overall, 4460 research reports (...) were published in 2006 by the 20 journals from five subspecialties (mean 223 (SD = 164) reports per journal; median 176; interquartile range 108–238). On average, 17.2 (7.7%) reports were from a journal’s own editorial board (SD = 10.7; median 15; interquartile range 10–23; n = 20), and 6.3 (2.8%) reports were from a member of the editorial board of one of the three rival journals within the specialty (SD = 7.3; median 3.5; interquartile range 1–8; n = 60). There was a statistically significant excess of publications from the journal’s own editorial board in 14 of the 20 journals (p<0.05). Journals were almost three times more likely to publish reports from their own editorial board than from one of the three rivals within their subspecialty (p<0.0001; median difference 11; Mann–Whitney U test; power for 5% significance >99.99%). Conclusions: There was a significant excess of publications from medical journals’ own editorial boards, although it is not possible to determine whether this is due to bias in the peer review process or selective submission by editors. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I examine the arguments against physician assisted suicide (PAS). Many of these arguments are consequentialist. Consequentialist arguments rely on empirical claims about the future and thus their strength depends on how likely it is that the predictions will be realized. I discuss these predictions against the backdrop of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and the practice of PAS in the Netherlands. I then turn to a specific consequentialist argument against PAS – Susan M. Wolf's feminist critique (...) of the practice. Finally, I examine the two most prominent deontological arguments against PAS. Ultimately, I conclude that no anti‐PAS argument has merit. Although I do not provide positive arguments for PAS, if none of the arguments against it are strong, we have no reason not to legalize it. (shrink)

In most areas of our lives, legal protections are in place to ensure that we have autonomous control over what happens in and to our bodies. However, there are fewer protections in place for autonomous choice when it comes to the food we purchase and consume. In fact, the current trend in US legislation is pushing us away from autonomous food choice. In this paper, I discuss two examples of this trend: corporate resistance to GM labeling laws and farm protection (...) laws. These examples are quite different from a legislative point of view. In one case, laws that would promote autonomous choice are actively resisted, whereas in the other case, laws that undermine autonomy are enacted. The common core of the two examples is the effect: in both cases, we are unable to determine whether the food we purchase and consume is consistent with our values. In both cases, then, autonomous choice about the food we purchase and put into our bodies is undermined. (shrink)

We offer obeisances to Lord Śiva, guru of knowledge, lord of the dance, who purifies by the very utterance of his name, who transcends all dualities. May he grant us permission to argue with his devotees. May he also give us his blessings to convince them.Properly speaking, comparative philosophy does not lead toward the creation of a synthesis of philosophical traditions. What is being created is not a new theory but a different sort of philosopher. The goal of comparative philosophy (...) is learning a new language, a new way of talking. The comparative philosopher does not so much inhabit both of the standpoints represented by the traditions from which he draws as he comes to inhabit an.. (shrink)

Adorno contends that something of what we think of knowing and rational agency operate in ways that obscure and deform unique, singular presentations by relegating them to survival-driven interests and needs; hence, in accordance with the presumptions of transcendental idealism, we have come to mistake what are, in effect, historically contingent, species-subjective ways of viewing the world for an objective understanding of the world. And further, this interested understanding of the world is deforming in a more radical way than just (...) obscuring what is there for the sake of interested needs and purposes; these instrumental ways of knowing and acting, are broadly self-interested, in the interest of survival, without effective concern for the well-being and worth of others; by becoming generalized and exclusive, hegemonic, by driving out modes of encountering things and persons that support their differences and independence, their needs and interests, these instrumental practices are the deepest cause of t. (shrink)